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NOTES
ENTERTAINMENT TITLE DUPLICATION CASES:
A PROCESS OF EVOLUTION*
With the advent of mass communication and mass distribution, an
appealing title has become an absolute necessity in the entertainment field.
The creation of road companies has enabled the "Broadway play" to
travel to the medium sized communities and radio and television have
enabled entertainment products to be delivered directly to the home. In
order to compete successfully with other readily available entertainment
products, each must be given a title that both immediately attracts the
attention of the customer and is easy to remember. Moreover, if the title
is popular in its own right, advertising the product to which it is attached
will be easier and less expensive. Because of these factors the entertain-
ment field frequently places a high monetary value on a title which em-
bodies the proper characteristics.' Indeed, Warner Brothers recently
paid an author $200,000 for the movie rights of the best-selling book
Sex and the Single Girl, yet, it appears that the book itself cannot be
adapted as a movie script, and the author assumed no script writing duties
under the contract.
According to a studio spokesman, what Warner's bought
was not the book but simply its title. Current Hollywood eco-
nomic theory holds that the safest bet is to put one's money into
a "pretested property" that has a "presold audience," and a best-
selling title is considered the safest guarantee of all.'
In view of the mass production techniques required by the seemingly
insatiable entertainment appetite of modern America it is almost inevit-
able that there are numerous duplications of title, some intentional and
some by chance. The newspapers recently reported that Miss Zsa Zsa
* This Note was awarded First Prize in the 1963 Nathan Burkan Memorial Com-
petition at Indiana University School of Law. It is published through the courtesy of
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1. For a discussion of some of the attributes of a desirable title in the entertain-
ment field as well as a discussion of the most productive sources of such titles see Tan-
nenbaum, Copyright Law: Titles in the Entertainment Field, 45 A.B.A.J. 459 (1959).
2. Life, March 1, 1963, p. 65. This appears to be the highest price paid for a
title. For other sales and legal awards see Tannenbaum, supra note 1, at 459, 461; Klein,
Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works in Unrelated Fields Actionable Piracy,
28 BRooKLYN L. REv. 59, 67 (1961).
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Gabor was writing a book entitled Bedtime Stories for Adults, and that
an Iowa minister had just published a book under the same title.' One
author states that an examination of the United States Catalogue of Copy-
right Entries shows "that title duplication is the rule rather than the ex-
ception."4
Since titles of entertainment products unquestionably have monetary
value and because there are recurring instances of competing use of the
same or substantially similar titles, the parties frequently find resort to
the courts necessary for a determination of their respective rights. This
note will examine the protection which is accorded through such litigation
to those whose titles have been duplicated,5 with particular emphasis upon
the evolutionary nature as well as the present status of the case law, and
some tentative conclusions will be advanced about the future course of
events in this area.'
3. Peterson, Life Begins at Forty, Indianapolis Star, March 10, 1963, p. 8, col. 1.
Even more recently, reports appeared about the legal problems of Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy surrounding the title of his book The Enemy Within. A newspaper
reporter, Irene Kuhn, apparently is suing Kennedy on the grounds that his sale of the
movie rights to the title have unfairly interfered with the rights she acquired by use of
the same title on a book written some ten years before the Attorney General's. Walter
Winchell, Broadway and Elsewhere, Indianapolis Star, Sept. 29, 1963, sec. 2, p. 1, col. 1.
4. NICHOLSON, A MANUAL OF COPYRIGHT PRACrIcE FOR WaTERS, PUBLISHERS, AND
AGENTS 165 (2d ed. 1956). A "Title Report" prepared by a New York law firm shows
no less than seventy-seven uses of the title Backfire for plays, motion pictures, radio,
television and fiction works between, 1913 and 1956. Netterville and Hirsch, Piracy and
Privilege in Litcrary Titles, 32 So. CAL. L. Rav. 101, 152-57 (1959).
5. The term "title duplication" is used as a convenient description of this type of
case. It is not meant to infer that exact duplication is required. A title that is sub-
stantially the same or constitutes a colorable imitation will raise the same issues. See
National Picture, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208 (2d Cir. 1920) (Blindness
of Youth v. Blind Youth). See generally RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 728-29 (1938).
6. Because substantially different questions are presented, no attempt will be made
to analyze the protection afforded to a title which is used periodically, e.g., the titles of
newspapers, magazines, etc. See generally 2 NIms, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS § 279 (4th ed. 1947) ; see, e.g., HMH Publishing Co. v. Hale, 156 F.
Supp. 594 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Time, Inc. v. Motor Publications, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 846
(D. Mass. 1955). Also, no attempt has been made to delineate the protection afforded
a character. See generally 2 NIns, op. cit. supra, § 280; Comment, Literary Property in
Characters: Protection Afforded Authors by Copyright and Unfair Competition, 21 AL-
BANY L. REV. 185 (1957) ; see, e.g., Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir.
1942) ; Detective Comics v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1939),
aff'd, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940). Nor has any attempt been made to determine when
an association in the entertainment field can prevent another group from using a con-
fusingly similar name. See generally 1 NIms, op. cit. supra, § 86; see, e.g., Metropolitan
Opera Ass'n v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n of Chicago, 81 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ill. 1948) ;
Duemling v. Fort Wayne Community Concerts, Inc., 188 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. 1963). The
primary emphasis will be on the legal protection afforded the author or composer who
has applied his title to a single literary effort. For a summary of the area of rights in
the entertainment field see KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, AND OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND AR-
TISTIC WORKS (1960).
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I. STATUTORY NoN-PROTECTION
A. Copyright
Pursuant to the enabling language of the Constitution,' Congress
has afforded to authors and composers a monopoly in their original
works through the enactment of the copyright laws.' However, it has
been judicially settled since 1850 that this monopoly protection does not
extend to the mere title of the work. In Jollie v. Jaques,' the case which
apparently established this principle, it was recognized that a title "is
sometimes, doubtless, the source of as much profit as the intrinsic merit
of the work itself."" However, "the right secured [by the copyright
law] is the property in the piece of music, the production of the mind and
genius of the author, and not in the mere name given to the work ...
The title is an appendage to the book or piece of music. . . . "" Not
only have subsequent decisions consistently adhered to this rule,12 but the
most recent regulations of the Copyright Office specifically enumerate
"names, titles, and slogans" as works which are not subject to copyright.1 3
B. Trademark
In the Lanham Act,"4 Congress has attempted to continue its protec-
tion of trademarks against unfair or deceptive uses. Nevertheless, in the
law of trademark as in the law of copyright, it has been judicially de-
termined that entertainment titles do not fall within the protected area.
The current view as to the registerability of such titles, or nonregister-
ability to be more precise, is represented by it Re Cooper.'"
In 1953, Cooper's application for the registration of Teeny-Big as a
trademark for children's books was refused by the Examiner of Trade-
marks, and the Assistant Commissioner affirmed the Examiner's posi-
tion. Cooper then appealed to the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.' 6 That court pointed out that the Lanham Act precludes
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, which reads in part: "The Congress shall have Power
. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries ... "
8. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 9 (Supp.
III, 1962).
9. 13 Fed. Cas. 910 (No. 7437) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850).
10. Id. at 914.
11. Ibid.
12. See, e.g., Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175 Fed. 276 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) ; Johnston
v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (Dist. Ct. App.
1947).
13. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1960).
14. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1958).
15. 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 923, 254 F.2d 611 (1958).
16. Id. at 925, 254 F.2d at 612.
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the registration of a mark which merely describes the product to which
it is affixed. Thus, while Coca-Cola or Coke could be registered to
cover a carbonated beverage or soft drink, a request to register "car-
bonated beverage" or "soft drink" would be refused. In the field of
literary endeavor, "however arbitrary, novel or nondescriptive of contents
the name of a book-its title-may be, it nevertheless describes the book.
. -Iow else would you describe it-what else would you call it?"'"
Thus, the title of a book, according to the court, serves the same function
as the words "soft drink" as applied to a liquid; it merely serves as a
description of one-the Teeny-Big books-among all the books in the
world. It does not describe the particular book, i.e., the Teeny-Big book
with page thirty torn at the upper right-hand corner or the three thous-
andth Teeny-Big book to be printed. In explicating the policy behind the
decision, Judge Rich noted that the monopoly rights afforded to literary
property through the laws of copyright was for a limited duration, while
trademark protection endured as long as the use continued."5 Thus, the
court's refusal to grant registration was primarily the result of a judicial
aversion to extending absolute protection to an author or composer's title.
The result of the Jollie and Cooper cases is that Congress, as the
courts have interpreted the copyright and trademark laws, has not yet
afforded statutory protection to titles. This may result, as the Cooper
case implies, from what Professor Chafee has characterized as a policy
against monopolies, particularly in the field of ideas. 9 Consequently, the
17. Id. at 929, 254 F.2d at 615. The court went on to point out that the name of a
series of books containing the same central character, etc., could be registered since it
served the same function as the name of a periodical or newspaper, Ibid.
18. Id. at 930, 254 F.2d at 615. Cf. Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed.
398 (8th Cir. 1913); Black v. Ehrich, 44 Fed. 793 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Crown Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. David McKay Co., 200 Misc. 905, 107 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
The court, in the Cooper case, appears to say that all items can be placed on a descend-
ing scale of sub-classifications and the rank on this scale will automatically determine
its status as a potential trademark. Thus, if Teeny-Big had corresponded with Coke on
this scale, it could have been registered. It might have been interesting if the court had
attempted to define the levels of this scale, because the only limits to the number of sub-
classes are the limits of one's imagination. If the scale starts with matter as the first
class, common to both Teeny-Big and Coke, it could descend to foods and artistic en-
deavors, then to liquid foods and literary artistic endeavors, then to soft drink liquid
foods and book-type literary artistic endeavors, and finally to Coke as a soft drink liquid
food and Teeny-Big as a book-type literary artistic endeavor. Using this scale, Teeny-
Big becomes the proper subject for registration. This merely serves to point up the ab-
surdity of any arbitrary scale system to determine registration applications. Perhaps
the court would have presented a more palatable decision if it had based it on a more firm
foundation, or even stressed the desirability of limiting monopolization in the area of
words and ideas.
19. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1317-18 (1940). See also
Callman, Unfair Competition in Ideas and Titles, 42 CALIF. L. R~v. 77 (1954). For a
survey of the statutory protection afforded in other countries from Albania to Yugo-
slavia see IV PINNER, WORLD COPYRIGHT 254-83 (1958).
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total absence of statutory protection has rendered the common law of un-
fair competition the principal source of an author's or composer's
protection.
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION
American courts in early title duplication cases, while denying re-
covery under the copyright law, consistently refused to exclude legal pro-
tection under all doctrines if the proper fact situation was presented. 0
The case of G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie21 presented such a situation.
After the Merriam Company's copyright on the Webster Dictionary ex-
pired, the defendant began publishing a copy of the Merriam dictionary
and used the title Webster in such a way as to make it appear to be one
of the plaintiff's products. The court, while holding that the defendant
was entitled to use the name Webster because that title had entered the
public domain when the company's copyright on the dictionary expired,
stated that such use was subject to the law of unfair competition. -12 This
doctrine has continued to be the primary source of protection in subse-
quent title duplication cases.2"
A. Some Preliminary Problems
1. Wide Discretion
The extent of the doctrine of unfair competition defies delineation
because of its "plastic" nature. 4 It has, however, been generally stated
that:
[T]he law relating to unfair trade has a three-fold object:
First, to protect the honest trader in the business which fairly
belongs to him; second, to punish the dishonest trader, who is
taking his competitor's business away by unfair means; third,
to protect the public from deception.2"
Since the doctrine is invoked on essentially equitable grounds there is a
great deal of discretion vested in the judge, and it is applied only when
20. See, e.g., Benn v. Leclercq, 3 Fed. Cas. 201, 202 (No. 1308) (C.C.D. Mass.
1873) ; Jollie v. Jaques, 13 Fed. Cas. 910, 914 (No. 7437) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850).
21. 159 Fed. 638 (1st Cir. 1908).
22. Id. at 640-41. If, as Jollie v. Jaques indicates, the copyright laws do not extend
to the title, they offered no protection for the Webster name even before the copyright
expired. However, copying the contents was unlawful prior to the expiration.
23. See, e.g., National Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed.
208 (2d Cir. 1920); Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398 (8th Cir. 1913);
Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ; Paramore
v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
24. See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925)
(L. Hand, J.).
25. Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398, 405 (8th Cir. 1913).
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his sense of justice indicates that a certain undefined standard of business
activity has been violated. The applications of the doctrine to particular
fact situations frequently appear to be inconsistent because of the varyiAg
economic predelictions of the judges.26
2. Necessity for Underlying Copyright
A question which has frequently been presented to the courts and
never clearly answered is whether an author or composer has any right
in a title to a work which was never copyrighted or on which the copy-
right has expired. The notion was advanced in a number of earlier cases
that if the work in question was not registered under, and hence was un-
protected by, the copyright law, its title would similarly be accorded no
protection.2" However, such pronouncements were not directed to the
protection which might be afforded by the doctrine of unfair competition,
for they are to be found in cases decided before the scope of that doc-
trine's application to title duplication cases had been fully established.
The distinction which should be drawn was clearly pointed out by then
Judge Cardozo:
If the copyright does not exist, or, once existing, has been
lost, the name is lost, too, in so far as it is merely a symbol de-
scriptive of the copyrighted thing. . . We are not to confuse
such situations with others which, superficially similar, are
fundamentally distinct. A name which has become descriptive
of one play may not be attached by a competitor to another
when the duplication will mislead the public into the belief that
the two performances are alike. . . . So a name which is as-
sociated in common thought, not merely with the thing pro-
duced, but with the source or origin of production, may not be
used, though the term of copyright . . . has expired, without
explanation adequate to guard against mistake.28
This view is the more desirable since the purpose of the doctrine of un-
fair competition" is not related to the statutory monopoly granted under
the copyright law, but owes its existence rather to the ethical standards
of certain competitive activities. When a title has acquired the inde-
26. Tannenbaum, supra note 1, at 460.
27. See, e.g., Glazer v. St. Elmo Co., 175 Fed. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909);
Harper v. Ranous, 67 Fed. 904, 905 (C.C.SD.N.Y. 1895) ; Jollie v. Jaques, 13 Fed. Cas.
910, 914 (No. 7437) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850).
28. Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N.Y. 7, 20, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (1924). Accord, G. &
C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 159 Fed. 638, 640 (1st Cir. 1908) ; Patten v. Superior Talking
Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
29. See text accompanying note 25, supra.
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pendent descriptive quality referred to by Judge Cardozo, usually de-
noted as secondary meaning,"0 the common law doctrine should afford
protection without regard to the presence or absence of an underlying
copyright on the work itself.
3. Federal v. State Law
A serious jurisdictional problem is created, however, by adoption of
the view that the unfair competition doctrine is not dependent on an un-
derlying copyright. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the copyright laws. 1 This permits the development
and application of a unified body of federal law in all copyright cases.
However, unfair competition, being a common-law doctrine, presents no
federal question, and a suit based solely on such an allegation may be
brought in a state court which will apply state law.32 Of course plaintiff
can proceed in a federal court where either diversity of citizenship is
present or a claim of unfair competition is joined with a "substantial and
related" claim under the copyright law,3 but under Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins,"4 the federal courts must nevertheless apply the state law of unfair
competition to the dispute. Such a result not only presents some obvious
yet complicated conflict of laws problems in this age of widespread dis-
tribution of entertainment products, but also promotes a fragmentation
of the law of unfair competition; there could conceivably be fifty dif-
ferent views on the protection afforded titles under the doctrine as each
state develops its own body of case and statutory law. 3
This fragmentation of the law of unfair competition, coupled with
the wide discretion vested in courts to determine its applicability to a
particular set of facts, makes any attempt to concisely set forth the law
in this area impossible. Nevertheless, it is possible to arrive at some
general conclusions about what type of activity will likely demand an
invocation of the doctrine, and to formulate some tentative standards
which courts will employ, regardless of the fact situation, to determine
violations of the applicable law of unfair competition.
B. The Theories of Protection
One basic requirement in any suit for unfair competition is that the
plaintiff be the owner of the right for which he claims protection, and
30. This quality of "secondary meaning" will be discussed insfra.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1958).
32. Corbett v. Purdy, 80 Fed. 901 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1958).
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. For a criticism of this fragmentation of the law of unfair competition see
Chafee, supra note 19, at 1299-1301. See also KAPLAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 493-94.
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that the defendant have claimed or exercised that right. 6 But beyond
this elementary idea, what theory of protection is available to a plaintiff
in such an action? The recent case of McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random
House, Inc.," appears to have established the broadest protection pres-
ently available in any jurisdiction. The court there stated that the plain-
tiff need only show either: (a) a likelihood that the public will confuse
the product of the defendant for that of the plaintiff, (b) a likelihood that
the public will be misled as to the source of the defendant's product, be-
lieving it to be produced or sponsored by the plaintiff or (c) a likelihood
that a dilution in the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's title will occur in the
mind of the public because of the similarity of the defendant's title."
Because each of these theories has been accepted to a degree in one juris-
diction or another, they merit individual consideration here.
1. Confusion of Products
Americans live by symbols. 9 They purchase a product without
careful inspection simply because of the brand-name appearing on it, the
name being taken by the consumer as a guarantee of craftsmanship from
the manufacturer to himself. When a second manufacturer places the
same brand-name on his similar product, the public is quite apt to rely
on the symbol alone and purchase the goods, believing them to be those
of the first manufacturer. The natural result of such practices is that the
public is deceived and the original user of the name deprived of a po-
tential sale. Moreover, if the products of the second manufacturer are
of inferior quality the public is also damaged in a monetary sense, and
the reputation for quality of the original user of the name consequently
suffers injury. To prevent fraud of this nature, the law of unfair com-
petition prohibits the use of a mark or name by one person or concern
which the public associates with the goods of another, and this proscrip-
tion applies to titles used in the entertainment field just as it does to titles
or brand-names used by "producers" in other segments of the economy.
36. See, e.g., Franklin v. Hart, 129 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), where the plain-
tiffs, composers of the song Anniversary Waltz, were seeking to enjoin the producers
of a similarly titled play from licensing or selling the movie rights to the title. The court
denied relief since the defendants had only purchased the play rights from the author of
a similarly titled play. The author had retained all other rights in the play. Thus, the
defendants had no rights to convey to a motion picture concern, and the court rightly
refused to enjoin them from doing so.
37. 32 Misc. 2d 704, 710-711, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646, 653-54 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
38. This last area was included in the case as being within N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
368(d), but will be covered in the text discussion as an evolving part of the law of un-
fair competition, independent of any statutory provision.
39. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
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Initially, the plaintiff seeking to establish his right through the laws
of unfair competition to the exclusive use of a title encountered appre-
ciable difficulty, for judicial relief depended on whether or not members
of the public had actually been deceived by the defendant's practices. "
Later cases dispensed with this requirement of actual deception, and
granted relief where the defendant clearly intended to deceive the public,
and where the duplication was so similar as to make deception likely."
The present view in this areas, however, is that the element of intent will
be inferred where product confusion is an inevitable consequence of the
defendant's conduct.4" Thus, if the defendant has applied a duplicate
title to the same type of product as that of the plaintiff in such a manner
that the public is likely to be deceived, the courts will generally grant a
remedy without regard to the former's actual intent. This leaves un-
answered, however, the question of what is a "similar product."
The early cases afforded protection in duplication disputes only
where the litigants' products were of such a nature as to make it likely
that the public would mistake one for the other. The then prevailing
rule, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Atlas
Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith,4" required that the plaintiff have used his
title on the same class, but not necessarily the same species, of goods as
had the defendant. Consequently, while the court in Atlas admitted
arguendo that the defendant's motion picture which used the name Nick
Carter as part of the title might be drawing on the good-will of the plain-
tiff's series of books published under generally the same nanme, the court
held that motion pictures and books were not competing products.4" Yet
40. Osgood v. Allen, 18 Fed. Cas. 871, 876 (No. 10603) (C.C.D. Me. 1872).
41. E.g., Estes v. Williams, 21 Fed. 189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Golenpaul v. Rosett,
174 Misc. 114, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct 1940) ; Frohman v. Payton, 34 Misc. 275, 68
N.Y. Supp. 849 (Sup. Ct. 1901).
42. National Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208, 211
(2d Cir. 1920). See also G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Ogilvie, 159 Fed. 638 (1st Cir. 1908) ;
Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal.2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950) ; Hopkins
Amusement Co. v. Frohman, 202 Ill. 541, 67 N.E. 391 (1903). But cf. Walt Disney
Prod., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), in
which the defendant produced and proposed to release his movie Alice in Wanderland at
about the same time and in the same city as the Disney production of the same name.
Although the intent to take advantage of the plaintiff's extensive advertising could easily
have been inferred, the court denied an injunction and added "This is the sort of com-
petition that perhaps should be encouraged rather than suppressed." Id. at 775. The
case is distinguishable, however, since the plaintiff had not yet released his picture,
making it impossible, in the eyes of the court, for the title to have acquired a secondary
meaning. See note 81, infra.
43. 204 Fed. 398, 406 (8th Cir. 1913).
44. Ibid. This case appears clearly within the scope of confusion of source or
sponsorship, to be considered later. See also Day v. Twentieth Century Fox, Ltd.,
[1940] A.C. 112, 126 (Ont.), where the court refused to permit recovery by the owners
of the copyrighted song The Man Who Broke the Bank at Monte Carlo from the pro-
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another court, strictly adhering to the competing products requirement by
stating that "there must be a real present or prospective competition, that
is an endeavor to get the same trade from the same people at the same
time," 5 found nonetheless that the defendant's motion picture Blindness
of Youth was of the same class as the plaintiff's play, Blind Youth. View-
ing the facts of these cases, the distinction between which products com-
pete and which do not may, perhaps, depend on the manner in which they
are presented to the audience or consumer. Direct competition was found
to be present between a play and a movie, both of which are presented in
a theatre to live audiences. The necessary competitive element was held
to be lacking, however, between a movie and a series of books, since those
intending to purchase the book could hardly be confused enough by mere
title similarity to buy a ticket for the movie.
2. Confusion of Source or Sponsorship
The end of strict judicial adherence to the competition rule in title
duplication cases was foreshadowed by a decision outside the entertain-
ment field in 1925. In Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc.,46 the Amer-
ican division of the internationally famous manufacturer of airplanes and
automobiles initiated suit against a manufacturer of radio tubes to enjoin
its use of the name Rolls-Royce. Without distinguishing the theories of
product confusion, confusion of source or sponsorship, or dilution, the
court enjoined the defendant's use of the name. Since there is little
likelihood that a person would mistake a radio tube for either an air-
plane or an automobile, the decision acknowledged, albeit sub silentio,
that there could be an action for unfair competition absent the element
of direct competition."7 The court particularly emphasized that as both
automobiles and radio tubes involve the use of electrical energy the
public might reasonably infer that the defendant's tubes were produced
ducers of a motion picture of the same name. In holding these to be non-competing
products, the court said, "A frying pan cannot be passed off as a kettle." But cf. Froh-
man v. William Morris, Inc., 68 Misc. 461, 123 N.Y. Supp. 1090 (Sup. Ct. 1910), where
the court held that the burlesque Chanticlair unfairly competed with the serious play
Chantecler and added:
. . . doubtless true that no one intending to witness the plaintiff's play could
possibly mistake the defendant's performance for it. But this power to dis-
tinguish would not save the playgoer who had gotten into the wrong theatre.
His money would have been paid and his evening would have been irretrievably
lost . ..
Id. at 464, 123 N.Y. Supp. at 1092.
45. National Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208, 211
(2d Cir. 1920).
46. 4 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1925).
47. See also Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948)
(magazines v. girdles); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shops, Inc..
3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (smoking supplies v. shirts).
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by a division of the famous company. Hence, if the tubes were of
inferior quality, the excellent reputation currently enjoyed by the plain-
tiff would be impaired. Furthermore, the court continued, the de-
fendant's creditors might attribute to the defendant a great deal more
financial responsibility than he actually possessed if they associated his
endeavors with those of the plaintiff company."
This same line of reasoning was declared applicable to the entertain-
ment field in Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp.,4" where
the court, in delineating the developing theory of unfair competition
which will be referred to as confusion of source or sponsorship, stated:
In this day of expafi'ding business activity . . . where
large corporations produce and sell a variety of unrelated prod-
ucts upon which they often place a single trademark, it would
be obviously unjust and ineffective to adhere to the old doc-
trine that unfair trade practices can only be enjoined in cases
where actual competition exists between the parties."0
The court in Rock-Ola ultimately determined that, under the facts pre-
sented, the plaintiff was not entitled to the protection of the unfair com-
petition doctrine because the litigant's products were unconnected com-
mercially.5 ' But it nonetheless injected the source or sponsorship theory
48. Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir. 1925).
49. 23 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ill. 1937).
50. Id. at 8-9.
51. The court denied an injunction in this case because the plaintiff's copyright
covered the printed instructions for playing the game Bank Night, while the defendant
used the name Big Bank Night on some of its pin-ball machines. Not only was direct
competition absent, but the products were so unrelated that the public was not likely
to connect the defendant's machines with the plaintiff's company. See also Becker v.
Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 1943), where the court stated that the puplic
was not likely to confuse the defendant's romantic screen play We Who Are Young as
in any way being connected with the plaintiff's book of the same title which was a dis-
cussion of economic and political problems during the New Deal. See also Gotham
Music Serv., Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music Publishing Co., 259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57
(1932), where the plaintiff had revived the uncopyrighted song Gambler's Blues under
the title St. James Infirmary. After an extensive advertising campaign, the song became
a hit, and the defendant published a version under the title St. James Infirmary or Gam-
bler's Blues so as to pick up all customers. The court denied an injunction saying that
since the public had no idea who published any particular song, there was no chance of
the public trying to buy the plaintiff's product and getting the defendant's. The source,
according to the court, plays no part in this type of purchase so there couldn't be any
confusion of source. A strong dissent by Justice Crane said the defendant's refusal to
sell the song under its old title clearly demonstrated his unfair intent to capitalize on
what the plaintiff's energy had turned into a valuable property. Id. at 93, 181 N.E. at
59. But cf. Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (preliminary injunction), where the plaintiff, the owner of a successful television
series sued to enjoin its former licensee from continuing to use the Wyatt Earp name in
connection with its children's playsuits. The court, in granting relief, said "The finding
is nearly inescapable that the commercial value now enjoyed by the name is attributable
NOTES
into the entertainment field, and there it remains today. 12
3. Dilution 3
If the confusion of source or sponsorship theory seems far removed
from the general notion of unfair competition because it eliminates the
necessity of direct competition, the concept of dilution must appear as a
completely separate branch of the law. Not only is there no direct com-
petition requirement, but the plaintiff needn't even show confusion on
the part of the public; neither the plaintiff nor his product need be men-
tally associated with the defendant or his product by the general public.
The dilution theory essentially protects the right to the distinctive
advertising appeal of a name or title which the public has grown to as-
sociate with the plaintiff. For example, the name Rolls-Royce is its own
advertisement because of the widespread public recognition of that name
as symbolic of a quality product. The company could merely paste the
name on an otherwise blank billboard and a message of expert craftsman-
ship would be conveyed to most persons who observe it. What would
happen, however, if an ice cream manufacturer labeled his product with
this same name, and advertised extensively in connection with his pro-
duct? There is clearly no competition between automobiles and ice cream,
so the confusion of product theory would be unavailable to Rolls-Royce.
Moreover, few members of the public would imagine that the original
almost entirely to the program." Id. at 624. The court, however, went on to point out
that because of the well recognized practice of licensing the name of successful television
heroes, subject to quality control standards, there was an actual likelihood of confusion
of sponsorship and potential injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Also, there was an
element of direct competition since any sales by the defendant decreased the royalties
due the plaintiff from its licensee who sold playsuits. Id. at 626. This, howver, seems
to jump over the question of whether the plaintiff's rights in the title included the right
to grant licenses and exclude non-licensed users of the name. It is important to note,
however, that a recognized and frequently utilized trade practice may lead to an exten-
sion of the area of protection. On this point see also, Johnston v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 802, 187 P.2d 474, 487 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947), where
the court noted that the purchase of a right to use a title, wholly divorced of any in-
terest in the material, was a frequent transaction in the movie industry. In recognizing
this as a legally protectable transaction, the court said, "We should be realistic." But see,
Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 117, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 893 (Sup. Ct. 1940), where
the court, adhering to the traditional view, said, "... a trade-mark right is not a
right in gross ... "
52. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Motor Publications, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 846 (D. Md. 1955);
Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950). But cf.
Crown Publishers, Inc. v. David McKay Co., 200 Misc. 905, 107 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct.
1951), where the court held that in the case of books, the public buys as much because
of the author's name as because of the title.
53. For an extensive discussion of dilution and a summary of the statutory and
case law see, 3 CALMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS §§ 84.2-
84.2(b) (2d ed. 1950) ; Derenburg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-
dilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 439 (1956).
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user of the name had diversified his product line to the extreme of pro-
ducing ice cream, so the confusion of source or sponsorship theory would
also have little application to the case. Hence, a billboard with just the
name Rolls-Royce on it would now mean automobiles or ice cream, and as
the number of manufacturers and producers employing that name con-
tinued to increase, the unique image formerly enjoyed by its originator
would diminish. At some point, the name could become so commonly
used that it no longer would have a secondary meaning in reference to
automobiles, and the original user would not even be entitled to its ex-
clusive use within his own product line."
A case which highlights the dilution theory is Tiffany & Co. v. Tif-
fany Productions, Inc., 5 in which the famous jewelry firm sued to enjoin
the defendant's use of the name Tiffany in its business of producing and
distributing motion pictures. The defendant had coupled the use of a
diamond design and phrases such as "Tiffany, It's a Gem," "Controlled
by Tiffany," etc., with use of the name itself and evidently its purpose in
doing so was partially accomplished, for there was testimony at trial that
some members of the public did think that the plaintiff might be con-
nected with the defendant's operations. The court issued an injunction
in order to prevent this typical confusion of source or sponsorship, but
went outside the facts to add: "The real injury in such cases of non-
competitive products 'is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use
upon non-competitive goods.' ,,s
54. An interesting example of this in the entertainment field may be drawn from a
pair of New York cases before the turn of the century. Munro wrote a series of detec-
tive books between 1872 and the date of the trials, employing the words Old Sleuth in all
of the titles. The series was a large success, and the imitators started to work. In
Munro v. Beadle, 55 Hun 312, 8 N.Y. Supp. 414, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1890), the defendant
had used the word Sleuth in connection with detective novels. In holding for the plain-
tiff, the court pointed out that the word Sleuth did not appear in the dictionary until
after 1880, and even then applied only to a track in the snow or earth. The plaintiff's
use in connection with a detective was novel and should be protected from infringing
competitors. Id, 8 N.Y. Supp. at 415. Some twenty-three months later, however, the
Court of Appeals, in Monro v. Tousey, 129 N.Y. 38, 29 N.E. 9 (1891), decided that the
same plaintiff could not enjoin the use of the name Young Sleuth in connection with
competing detective novels. According to the court, no one seeking to read about that
famous detective Old Sleuth could be deceived by the defendant's book. The court com-
pletely ignored the novelty of associating the word Sleuth with a detective. This may
support the inference that the public in general associated the word with detectives
rather than with the plaintiff's novels. If this is correct, the novelty of the plaintiff's
original use had indeed suffered a dilution in the intervening twenty-three months.
55. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd., 262 N.Y. 482, 188
N.E. 30 (1932).
56. Id. at 681, 264 N.Y. Supp. at 462. Callman indicates that this language shows
acceptance of the dilution theory, and criticizes the court for finding it expedient to de-
fend the decision under the confusion theory. 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 53, §
84.2(a).
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The dilution theory has been accepted expressly in at least one title
duplication suit in the entertainment field, Johnston v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp.," where the court said:
The law is not quiescent. It progresses. Evolution of the law
to meet changing conditions is exemplified by the attitude of
our [California] Supreme Court. The earlier cases held that
. * . a showing had to be made that the name was being used
by an infringer in a competing business. [But, subsequent
cases have] . . . held that an injunction should issue even
though the infringer was using the name in a non-competing
business. The reasoning of the later cases is that use by an-
other of a name or title results in a dilution of its value to the
original appropriator."5
Because the court found that the title of the plaintiff's book, Queen of the
Flat Tops, was both novel and widely known, and in view of the wide-
spread practice of authors selling the movie rights to their popular books,
this case could have been decided on the confusion of source or sponsor-
ship theory. The public would be likely to believe that the defendant's
movie was a mere adaptation of the plaintiff's novel. Hence, there was
no need to rely on the dilution theory, much less to base such reliance on
the dicta of the Tiffany case.9 Communis error facit ]us.
In summary, there are three theories of unfair competition upon
which a plaintiff may rely to establish his right to judicial relief when
a title he has devised, having acquired a secondary meaning, is appropri-
ated by another: (1) confusion of product, (2) confusion of source or
sponsorship and (3) dilution. The theories have been accepted to vary-
ing degrees in the different jurisdictions, and only reference to the case
law of a particular jurisdiction will indicate which have been judicially
recognized there. However, recovery under any theory requires proof
that a secondary meaning has been acquired. Consequently, delineation
of those elements commonly considered in ascertaining whether a sec-
ondary meaning has attached to a product and been retained is necessary.
57. 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
58. Id., 187 P.2d at 487, citing Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions Inc., 147
Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd., 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1932).
59. Callman indicates that where there is an intentional appropriation of a widely
accepted name, the courts presently afford protection even where there is little likeli-
hood of confusion. He approves this acceptance of the protection of the dilution theory,
but he severely criticizes the courts for the verbal contortions they usually engage in
in order to demonstrate that they are adhering to the conventional confusion theories
rather than embracing the new "heresy" of dilution. 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 53,
§ 84.2(a).
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C. Secondary Meaning
"'Secondary Meaning' is associationr, nothing more. It exists only
in the minds of those who identify some article of commerce or some
business house by some name or sign and associate the two in their
minds."6  While the existence of secondary meaning in a work or title
is ordinarily a question of fact,61 there are some elements of an entertain-
ment title which can be singled out as particularly influential upon a court
faced with the determination of that issue. This section is not, and could
not be, designed to define secondary meaning. This is, and probably will
remain, a question entirely related to the particular facts of each case.
The section is, however, designed to present some tentative and ad-
mittedly broad standards which have been gleaned from the cases that
may be helpful in analyzing individual situations.
1. Priority of Use
If the plaintiff is the first person to use a particular word or title he
is in a position to argue that any meaning the title or word has acquired
in the mind of the public is derived from his use. However, it is not un-
reasonable to state that most titles selected for entertainment products
today have been employed by others at some time in the past.2 The
courts have not authoritatively settled the problem of what effect such
prior use has on an individual's right to monopolize a title.
In denying protection for the book title Test Pilot, one court referred
to the fact that there were at least three prior users of this title. While
the decision was based on other grounds, the court evidenced a strong
doubt that a secondary meaning could be acquired by the plaintiff unless
he were the first user of the title.6" Other cases, however, indicate that
the plaintiff need only be the first user of the title on the particular class
of goods involved," which of course again raises the question of what
goods are members of the same class. 5 Still another court has stated
60. I Nims, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs § 37. See also
Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943).
61. See, e.g., Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal.2d 116, 222 P.2d 433,
437 (1950) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 716, comment b at 560 (1938).
62. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
63. Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), rev'd. on other grounds, 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939).
64. E.g., Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., 244 Fed. 293, 295, rev'd. on other
grounds, 247 Fed. 301 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Clode v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 200 App. Div.
532, 533, 193 N.Y. Supp. 176, 177 (1922).
65. See text accompanying notes 43-45, spra. In Selig Polyscope Co. v. Unicorn
Film Serv. Corp., 163 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd., 183 App. Div. 882, 169 N.Y.
Supp. 1113 (1918), the court found that the prior use by third parties as a song title
and a book title did not prevent the plaintiff from acquiring a secondary meaning in the
play The Rosary.
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that while the prior users would be entitled to continue their use of the
title, their existence would not prevent another from establishing a sec-
ondary meaning and then being able to exclude later users.6" Thus, the
courts have held: (1) any prior use precludes the acquisition of a
secondary meaning, (2) prior users will be permitted to continue, but if
the plaintiff establishes his secondary meaning he may enjoin subsequent
users and (3) if the plaintiff is the first to use the title on the particular
class of goods involved, he may enjoin other uses in connection with
those goods.
A sensible solution to the priority of use problem would be for courts
to deny the existence of a secondary meaning in the plaintiff's title if a
prior user, who could maintain an action against the plaintiff under the
theories recognized in the particular jurisdiction, has acquired and con-
tinues to retain a secondary meaning through his own use of the title. At
least one case, Golenpaul v. Rosett,67 has indicated that such a view might
be acceptable to the courts. In that case the defendant had published two
issues of a radio and movie magazine titled Iinformation Please in 1936,
but at that time was forced to discontinue publication because of a lack
of funds. In 1938 the plaintiff produced his highly successful radio
series of the same name, used it as the title of a book and was in the
process of making a movie under the same title. When, in 1939, the de-
fendant was financially able to resume publication of his magazine, the
plaintiff sought to enjoin his use of the name Infornatio Please in con-
nection with it. In granting the injunction the court inferred that it was
not simply a prior use that gave one an exclusive right to a particular
title, but rather it was the acquisition of a secondary meaning. If there
was no secondary meaning, a party had the non-exclusive right to use the
title. Under this postulation of the secondary meaning concept then,
when the plaintiff began to use the name in connection with his radio
program he was entitled to its non-exclusive use; but when the name be-
came so associated with his program that it acquired a secondary mean-
ing, he became entitled to its exclusive use, within the meaning of the
law of unfair competition." Thus, even if the defendant had used the
name prior to the plaintiff, he could be enjoined from further use if he,
the defendant, had failed to acquire and retain a secondary meaning.
66. Estes v. Williams, 21 Fed. 189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884).
67. 174 Misc. 114, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
68. Id. at 116, 18 N.Y.S.2d at 893. This, of course, presumes that the law of thejurisdiction affords protection in the absence of direct competition, i.e., that confusion of
source or sponsorship or dilution is an accepted theory.
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2. Fanciful Words
It is generally held that if a title is merely descriptive of the con-
tents of the work to which it is attached it cannot acquire a secondary
meaning. 9 Thus, for example, in the case of McGraw-Hill Book Co. v.
Random House, Inc.,7 it was held that the title PT- o9, John F. Kennedy
in World War II merely described what the reader was likely to find in
the book, and hence was not entitled to protection under the law of unfair
competition. The test is not whether a limited group would consider the
title descriptive, but whether the general public would consider it so.
Thus in deciding that the Virgin Queen, when applied to a play or movie
about Queen Elizabeth I, was merely descriptive, it was stated that even
the moderately educated would associate that particular title with that
particular monarch.71 Where, however, the title is fanciful or arbitrary,
conveying no message as to what the work's contents might be, it can
acquire a secondary meaning."
3. Length of Time Used
There is no definable period of time a title can be used to assure its
acquisition of a secondary meaning; such acquisition depends entirely
upon the facts of each individual case. 3 The Restatement of Torts points
out that "long continued use of the designation is evidence from which
this 'secondary meaning' may properly be inferred: but the inference
69. E.g., Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), revd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939) (Test Pilot) ; Crown Pub-
lishers, Inc. v. David McKay Co., 200 Misc. 905, 906, 107 N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (Confidential). Contra, Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp.,
70 Fed. 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1934) (The Gold Diggers).
70. 32 Misc. 2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct 1962).
71. Fishier v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 159 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D.
Cal. 1958). But cf. Martenet v. United Artists Corp., 56 F. Supp. 639, 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1944), where the court held that the novelette title Voice in the Wind was merely de-
scriptive in that it served to identify the work. As this is true of all titles, the test
should be whether they describe the contents rather than whether it is the description
people use when asking for the work. See also In Re Cooper, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
923, 929, 254 F.2d 611, 615 (1958), where the court said, ". . . however arbitrary, novel
or non-descriptive of the contents the name of a book-its title-may be, it nevertheless
describes the book .... ." The court, however, was deciding a trademark application
case, and not a question of unfair competition.
72. E.g., Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187
P.2d 474, 482 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (Queen of the Flat Tops) ; Selig Polyscope Co. v.
Unicorn Film Serv. Corp., 163 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 183 App. Div. 882,
169 N.Y. Supp. 1113 (1918) (The Rosary) ; Dickey v. Mutual Film Corp., 174 App. Div.
99, 160 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (The Come-Back) ; Monro v. Beadle, 55 Hun
312, 8 N.Y. Supp. 414, 415 (Sup. Ct. 1890) (Old Sleuth). See generally 3 CALLAIAN,
op. cit. supra note 53, § 83.2.
73. I Nius, op. cit. supra note 60, § 38(a). See, e.g., Cal. Crushed Fruit Corp. v.
Taylor Beverage & Candy Co., 38 F.2d 885 (W.D. Wis. 1930) ; Sun Valley Mfg. Co. v.
Sun Valley Togs, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Hanson, 65 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Mo. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947).
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is rebuttable.""1  Where, however, the work has not yet been released to
the public, no secondary meaning is likely to have attached.7"
4. Extent of Use
Probably the most important single factor considered by courts in
determining the secondary meaning question is the extent to which the
plaintiff has used the title he has chosen for his work. Hopkinis Amuse-
ment Co. v. Frohnmtan presents a clear example of how an extensive use
of a title will result in a determination that a secondary meaning has at-
tached to it. The plaintiff in that action had purchased the exclusive
rights to dramatize the A. Conan Doyle and William Gillette story,
Sherlock Holnes. An extensive advertising campaign was conducted
prior to the performance of the plaintiff's play, it was presented in the
major metropolitan areas of the country and eventually became a great
success. The defendant was thereafter enjoined by the plaintiff from
producing Sherlock Holnes, Detective, a "greatly inferior" play, in his
Chicago theatre based upon an application of the confusion of product
theory by the court.7" The primary elements of the extensive use theory,
as exemplified by the Frohnan case, are: (a) the popularity of the plain-
tiff or the person from whom he purchased the work, (b) the extent of
the plaintiff's advertising, (c) the geographical area of the use and
(d) the success of the work to which the title is attached.
a. Popularity of plaintiff
Public acceptance of an author or composer may lead more readily
to his work's acquisition of a secondary meaning than would be likely if
the title's originator was a relative "unknown." When a famous author's
book or play is released it may take but a single advertisement or news
story-indeed a very short period of time-for the public to associate the
new work and its title with him. While very few cases refer expressly
74. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 716, comment b at 560 (1938). See also Chancellor of
Oxford Univ. v. Wilmore-Andrews Publishing Co., 101 Fed. 443 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900),
where the long use of the name Oxford in connection with bibles was stressed in enjoin-
ing the defendant's similar use of the name.
75. E.g., ,Valt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), where the plaintiff's movie Alice in Wonderland had not yet been
released. The court apparently did not consider the extensive advance advertising as a
"use," although there would seem to be no reason why a secondary meaning could not
be acquired through advance publicity, as in the ill-fated attempt to produce Tucker Tor-
pedo automobiles in the late 1940's. See also Fishler v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 159 F. Supp. 215, 217-18 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (unproduced play has no secondary
meaning).
76. 202 Ill. 541, 542, 67 N.E. 391, 392 (1903).
77. Id. at 542-43, 67 N.E. at 393.
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to this popularity concept,7 it is one which should be kept in mind, par-
ticularly as it affects the length of use, the extent of advertising, etc.,
necessary to create the required association in the mind of the public be-
tween the title and its original user.79
b. Advertising
An element frequently referred to by the courts in its search for
secondary meaning is the extensiveness of the plaintiff's advertising in
connection with his work.8" The purpose of advertising is, of course, to
cultivate a desire in the anticipated consumer class for the product adver-
tised. In order to relate this created demand to a shortened description
of the product, a title or name is employed in the advertising. It follows
that the more advertisements the plaintiff has put before the public, the
more the public is likely to mentally associate the title with the product or
with the plaintiff.8
c. Geographical area
Generally, products of the entertainment field are intended for at
78. Compare Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781, 782
(S.D.N.Y. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939) (an unknown
author), with Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., 244 Fed. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y.), rcv'd, 247
Fed. 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (well-known playwright).
79. But cf. Crown Publishers, Inc. v. David McKay Co., 200 Misc. 905, 907, 107
N.Y.S.2d 176, 177-78 (Sup. Ct. 1951), where the plaintiffs were well known for a series
of exposes using the word Confidential, and the defendant, who had authored the al-
legedly unfairly competing book Baseball Confidential, had previously written the best-
selling The Jackie Robinson Story. In denying the injunction, the court reasoned that
those who purchase books do so as much because of the author's name as the book's title.
Since the defendant's name was prominently displayed on the book and on the book
jacket, there was little chance of confusion. Accord, McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random
House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 705, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646, 649 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where the
court pointed out that both authors had previously written best-sellers.
80. E.g., Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934)
(approximately $500,000 spent in advertising) ; Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc.,
36 Cal. 2d 116, 124, 222 P.2d 433, 435 (1950) (about $3,300 spent in advertising) ; Selig
Polyscope Co. v. Unicorn Film Serv. Corp., 163 N.Y. Supp. 62, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd,
183 App. Div. 882, 169 N.Y. Supp. 1113 (1918) (widely advertised).
81. But cf. Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Picture, Inc., 98 F. Supp.
774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), where the plaintiff had conducted an extensive advertising cam-
paign for his movie Alice in Wonderland. In denying an injunction, the court indicated
that no amount of advertising could create a secondary meaning if the product had not
yet been released to the public. Apparently the court felt that even though the advertis-
ing had created the demand, that demand could not be associated to an unmarketed
product. Id. at 776. The likelihood of the plaintiff not subsequently releasing the movie
would appear minute, so the created demand was for a specific product of the plaintiff's.
It's difficult to see why an extensively pre-advertised product such as this could have
a secondary meaning the day after it is released, but not the day before. See also
McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 712, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646,
655 (Sup. Ct. 1962), where the court, in denying an injunction, indicated that the de-
fendant had selected his title before the plaintiff's book had been released for sale.
While this might be relevant if intent were required, it is difficult to see that it has any
bearing on the plaintiff's acquisition of a secondary meaning.
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least nationwide distribution. The plaintiff, in any action to contest the
right of another to employ the same or similar title, will therefore attempt
to assert and establish his exclusive right to use the title with relation to
his product throughout the country." To be entitled to such extensive
relief the weight of authority demands the plaintiff show that the general
public in the area within which he seeks to exclude other users-e.g., the
nation-has grown to associate the title with either the plaintiff or his
work.83 Directly contrary to this position is the holding in Jackson v.
Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc.8" At trial the plaintiff, author of the play
Slightly Scandalous, established that prior to the play's introduction two
trade journals made reference to it, and very brief notices were also run
in two Los Angeles newspapers. Further, it was shown that subsequent
to Hollywood rehearsals the play ran for fifteen performances in Phila-
delphia, only attracting about 3,000 customers during that period, and
then ran for only seven performances in New York City where it was
played to a total of about 750 people. Customary advertising was em-
ployed in both communities during the short periods when the play was
running, and critical reviews of the play appeared in the papers of these
cities. More than two years after the play's final performance, the de-
fendant made nationwide distribution of a movie with the same title. Not
only did the defendant suffer an adverse judgment of $17,500 on the
basis of these facts, but he was also informed by the California Supreme
Court that the number of people who would be likely to mentally associ-
ate the defendant's movie with his adversary's play was only relevant in
determining the amount of his liability. As long as there were "more
than a few" such persons the court declared, there could be a secondary
meaning in the plaintiff's title.8"
Admitting that plaintiffs in unfair competition cases should not be
saddled with the impossible task of having to prove to a court's satisfac-
82. However, names can acquire a secondary meaning in a particular geographical
area. Nims asserts that this will depend primarily on the nature of the business. If it
is a service or product that is usually sold in a single community, it can have a secondary
meaning in that city. Thus, the Yellow Cab Company of Chicago, while entitled to the
exclusive use of that name in Chicago, could not prevent its use in a distant city. I
Nins, op. cit. supra note 60, § 38, and cases cited therein.
83. See, e.g., Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (network television series) ; Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, Inc.,
8 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (1,236 different stories nationally distributed) ; Para-
more v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925) (numerous publications in na-
tional magazines) ; Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 13 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
(network radio program). See also Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943)
(sale of only 700 books insufficient) ; Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., 247 Fed. 301
(2d Cir. 1917) (production of play only in New York City insufficient).
84. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950).
85. Id. at 122, 222 P.2d at 437.
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tion that a numerical majority associate the title with the plaintiff or his
work, it seems impossible to retain the concept of necessary mental associ-
ation by the general public if the Jackson case is taken at face value. The
decision imputes the existence of a property right in the first user of the
title in controversy who lets "more than a few" people know about it-a
property right which absolutely excludes all future use of that same title
by others. Perhaps this case points up more poignantly than any other
the conflicting concepts of property right and monopolistic privilege."0
The Jackson case, treating the interest involved as a property right, af-
fords it the traditional broad protection extended to other property rights
in our society. Those cases which treat it as a monopolistic privilege in
an idea or language, on the other hand, seek to limit the protection
afforded.
d. Success
Since, as seen above, courts require a widespread mental association
by the general public of the title with the plaintiff or his work, the suc-
cess or failure of the sales effort may be some indication of whether or
not a secondary meaning has attached to his title. Where the work re-
ceives wide public approval a court is more likely to find that the requi-
site secondary meaning in the title has become established." But, con-
versely, where the work is poorly received by the public courts frequently
find that the product has acquired no secondary meaning.8 Once again,
standing in direct opposition to this position is Jackson v. Universal Int'l
Pictures, Inc. 9
Popularity is not a requirement for secondary meaning be-
86. See Birrell, Seven Lectures on the Law and History of Copyright in Books, in
KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER Topics
BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORxs 41 (1960).
See generally Callman, Unfair Competition in Ideas and Titles, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 77
(1954) ; see, e.g., High v. Trade Union Currier Publishing Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 526 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 803, 89 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1949), where a court invoked its
equitable powers to protect the disclosure of a tax exemption that was available under
the Internal Revenue Code.
87. E.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310 (2d
Cir. 1934) (very successful) ; National Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp.,
266 Fed. 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1920) (very popular) ; Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures,
Inc., 8 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (all America knows); Johnston v. Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d 474, 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947)
(considerable popularity) ; Selig Polyscope Co. v. Unicorn Film Serv. Corp., 163 N.Y.
Supp. 62, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 183 App. Div. 882, 169 N.Y. Supp. 1113 (1918)
(marked acceptance by the public).
88. E.g., Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943) (700 books sold or
given away); Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 25 F. Supp. 781, 784 (S.D.N.Y.
1938), rev'd on other grounds, 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939) (few sales of a book).
89. 36 Cal. 2d 116, 122, 222 P.2d 433, 437 (1950).
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cause notoriety and adverse discussion may bring about wide-
spread identification of the play by its title and may pique the
public interest. Likewise, advertising, even of an unpopular
play, may cause the public to identify it as one which has been
a "Broadway production."9
While having the exclusive right to the title of a first-class flop might
considerably decrease the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff,
the property right concept lends considerable credence to the notion that
perhaps an author or composer should not be deprived of the only thing
he can salvage-a widespread mental association that has advertising
value. This would enable him to revise the work and still take advantage
of its familiarity in order to make it a success, or at least give him the
opportunity to sell it in the market for whatever it will bring. The
monopoly concept, on the other hand, supports the view that only success-
ful works contribute to society to such a degree as to entitle them to judi-
cial protection.
These are the most important elements in establishing a secondary
meaning. To be sure others may be gleaned from the cases, but they are
usually stressed in isolated cases, and only because of the particular facts
presented." The elements which have been briefly discussed above are
those which have been repeatedly referred to by the courts regardless of
factual divergencies between the cases presented them, and are likely to be
those elements most seriously considered in future title duplication cases.
D. Retention of Secondary Meaning
If a secondary meaning is mental association it logically follows that
a secondary meaning may not only be acquired, but it may also be lost.
Since the doctrine of unfair competition proscribes interference by the
defendant with the secondary meaning attached to the plaintiff's title, a
showing by the former that whatever secondary meaning attributable at
one time to the plaintiff's title has been lost will preclude recovery. A
number of early cases, which fell without the entertainment title duplica-
tion field, established, if only briefly, that the defense of abandonment
required a showing of an actual intent to abandon.92 But the Restatement
90. Ibid.
91. See, e.g., Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir. 1925)
(reliance by defendant's creditors) ; Paramore v. Mack Sennett, Inc., 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal.
1925) (plaintiff gave defendant notice of his prior use); McGraw-Hill Book Co. v.
Random House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 711, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (price
of plaintiff's book substantially higher than price of defendant's book).
92. E.g., Saxlehner v. Eisner, 179 U.S. 19, 31 (1900); Andrew Jergens Co. v.
Woodbury, Inc., 273 Fed. 952, 960 (D. Del. 1921), aff'd 279 Fed. 1016 (3d Cir. 1922).
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of Torts has modified this absolute requirement of intent and bases aban-
donment on: (1) non-use coupled with (a) an intent to abandon and ac-
tual loss of the secondary meaning, or (b) the acquisition of a secondary
meaning by another user, or (2) non-use coupled with a withdrawal from
the business in which the name has formerly been used. 3
The title duplication cases, while never having discussed the ques-
tion of secondary meaning retention at great length, probably have estab-
lished an even more liberal test of abandonment than that set forth in
the Restatement. In title duplication cases, as in all others, courts will
consistently find a loss of secondary meaning, and hence deny recovery,
where there is a non-use, an intent to abandon and a loss of the mental
association of the title with its originator in the mind of the public.9" The
extension, however, is to be found in those cases involving a non-use,
without an intent to abandon, coupled with a loss of the mental associa-
tion. The Restatement position would require another to have acquired
an intervening secondary meaning, but the better reasoned title duplica-
tion cases view as relevant only the effect of the plaintiff's non-use upon
his own title. 5 Of course the defense of abandonment raises a question
of "fact to be determined by the jury on substantial evidence."9
III. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The law in title duplication cases has passed the point where one
need ask whether protection should ever be afforded. The answer from
Jollie v. Jaques" to McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random House, Inc."8 has
been a resounding yes! The principal area of uncertainty is, rather, how
much protection shall be afforded and by what means.
One group of authors feels that it is time to apply revolutionary new
concepts to the title duplication cases.99 While the means they would em-
ploy are not identical, the end result would be similar. Typical of this
93. RESTATEIdENT, TORTS § 752 (1938).
94. Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 117, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 893 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
95. See, e.g., Int'l Film Serv. Co. v. Associated Producers, Inc., 273 Fed. 585, 587
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (15 years non-use), Goldman v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 149 Misc. 226,
267 N.Y. Supp. 28, 29 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (13 years non-use) ; Screen Test, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Co., 277 App. Div. 755, 97 N.Y.S.2d 372 (3'A years non-use). But cf.
Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 124, 222 P.2d 433, 438 (1950)
(retained after 3 years non-use because of practice of selling titles to movie companies) ;
Saland v. Monogram Pictures Corp., 67 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (retained
after 10 years non-use because of movie reissue value).
96. Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 123, 222 P.2d 433, 438
(1950).
97. 13 Fed. Cas. 910 (No. 7437) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850).
98. 32 Misc. 2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
99. See, e.g., 3 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 53, at 1592; O'Brien, The Travails of
a Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 15 Bus. LAW. 279 (1960).
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group are those proposing the extension of the copyright law. As has
been seen, the Jollie case conclusively determined that the copyright law
does not, as then and now constituted, extend its protection to the titles
themselves. It did not, however, declare that Congress was powerless to
effectuate such an extension by appropriate legislation and it has been
proposed to amend the copyright law so as to permit the separate regis-
tration of titles having specified characteristics.' 0 While adoption of
such a proposal would eliminate the fragmentation of the law, thereby
promoting the development of a comprehensive and uniform body of
federal law, it represents a radical step on the road to infusing all literary
work with the characteristics of a property right. Such a result un-
doubtedly has much merit in the eyes of those associated with the enter-
tainment field, but the political climate and traditional opposition to
monopoly grants would not appear conducive to the successful achieve-
ment of such a major step and "it may be safely concluded that no such
amendment will be forthcoming in this country."' 0'1
A second group of writers seem to favor the process of evolution-
the process by which courts would continue to re-define the "plastic" law
of unfair competition to meet the changing needs of society. The sug-
gested speed with which this evolution is to and should take place varies
with the temperament of the particular writer. On the one hand it is said
that "instead of either standing pat or rushing blindly into a great un-
mapped territory, the courts can feel their way cautiously . . . [to] . . .
block out a few new kinds of standardized wrongs."' 0 ' Another and
more rapid process was envisioned when it was said that "the law and
the judge's sense of fairness should go hand in hand and . . . any de-
cision which does violence to the judge's own sense of fairness must stand
on shaky ground.... ""'
The history of the law in the title duplication area indicates that
those favoring the gradual development of the doctrine of unfair com-
petition will find their view accepted. The speed of this process will
continue to depend on the temperament and economic predelictions of
those who are charged with deciding the cases, individually and as a
group. The most likely area of evolution presently appears to be toward
the widespread acceptance of the dilution theory, but at least one predic-
100. Klein, Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works in Unrelated Fields
Actionable Piracy, 28 BRooKLYN L. RIv. 59, 84-87 (1961). Contra, WARNER, RADIO AND
TELEVISION RIGHTS § 243(a) (1953).
101. Netterville & Hirsch, Piracy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 So. CAL. L.
R.Ev. 101, 111 (1959).
102. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1315 (1940).
103. Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic
Property, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 770, 783 (1953).
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tion can be made without qualification: Those who advocate containing
the law of title duplication within its present boundaries are running
counter to the stream of history. As the court stated in the Johnston
case :104
Property rights exist because they promote the general wel-
fare. As society has developed there has been a corresponding
evolution in the development of property rights. Matters con-
sidered as near revolutionary a few short years ago. are now
accepted as facts. Legal history shows a continual recognition
of new interests and a gradual willingness to protect interests
in intangible things.
When the market place says that entertainment titles have monetary value
and must be effectively protected, can the courts be far behind?
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The general public, legal writers and the courts long have recognized
the inequities of the law in its treatment of the indigent criminal de-
fendant. For many years legal assistance has been provided to the in-
digent in some areas of the United States through private legal aid so-
cieties, yet this activity has been restricted almost entirely to civil litiga-
tion.1 In those few areas where there has been private legal assistance
for the indigent criminal defendant, a lack of funds and the sheer volume
of cases has limited the scope of these programs.' For these reasons the
burden of protecting the indigent in a criminal prosecution has been upon
the courts.
In early decisions little consideration was given to the plight of the
indigent although prosecuted under a judicial system which relies heavily
upon the adversary system to protect individual rights. After 1900,
however, increasing recognition was given to the importance of counsel
104. Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187 P.2d
474, 487 (Dist. Ct App. 1947).
1. "[0] f the 200 legal aid offices in existence by mid-1958, only six handle criminal
cases." SPECIAL COMIMx. TO STUDY DEFENDER SYSTEm, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF N.Y., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, 42-44 (1959).
2. Id. at 69, 71-72.
